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Abstract
In this paper, we study sparsity-exploiting Mastermind algorithms for
attacking the privacy of an entire database of character strings or vectors,
such as DNA strings, movie ratings, or social network friendship data.
Based on reductions to nonadaptive group testing, our methods are able to
take advantage of minimal amounts of privacy leakage, such as contained
in a single bit that indicates if two people in a medical database have any
common genetic mutations, or if two people have any common friends in
an online social network. We analyze our Mastermind attack algorithms
using theoretical characterizations that provide sublinear bounds on the
number of queries needed to clone the database, as well as experimental
tests on genomic information, collaborative filtering data, and online social
networks. By taking advantage of the generally sparse nature of these real-
world databases and modulating a parameter that controls query sparsity,
we demonstrate that relatively few nonadaptive queries are needed to
recover a large majority of each database.
1 Introduction
Privacy and data protection are important and growing concerns when deal-
ing with character strings or vector data. Medical databases are constrained
by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) rules to keep
identifying data private, for instance. Such databases in the future will com-
monly store DNA strings of patients, which will need to have their privacy
protected for obvious reasons. Likewise, attribute vectors, which reflect the
presence or absence of each of a large number of possible attributes, are com-
mon in biotechnology; for example, chemical attribute vectors (e.g., see [1, 2])
indicate the presence or absence of each of about a million attributes.
Privacy concerns also exist for online social networks and other databases
which store user preferences in vector form. For instance, knowledge of a social
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network user’s set of friends (representable as a row in an adjacency matrix)
is potentially a gateway privacy leak, for friendship overlaps have been shown
to be sufficient to de-anonymize individuals across multiple social networking
sites [3]. Likewise, the movie rating vectors in the database used for the Netflix
Prize contest consists of ratings of movies by individual users, which are gen-
erally deemed as sensitive information. Full access to such databases may be
constrained by privacy agreements or legitimate proprietary reasons for keeping
these databases private, even as they allow for limited types of queries to be
performed on them.
Each time a client queries such a database and it responds with an an-
swer, it reveals some information about its contents, even if the client and
the database are using a Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) protocol (e.g.,
see [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]) to process such a query. Thus, we can provide a crude
characterization of the risk of privacy loss in biological, medical, or proprietary
databases in terms of the existence of efficient algorithms that can take advan-
tage of the data leakage present in query responses to be able to replicate part
or all of the content of the database. We refer to such schemes as data-cloning
attacks.
Formally, in an algorithmic data-cloning attack, a querier, Bob, is allowed
certain types of queries to a database, X , that belongs to a data owner, Alice.
Bob’s goal is to replicate all or a large part of X through as few queries on
X as possible (and with low computational overhead). In this paper, we focus
on databases where X is a collection X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xg) of character strings
or vectors, over a fixed-size alphabet. With respect to the types of databases
we consider, we assume that Alice is willing to process comparison queries from
Bob, each of which consists of Bob providing a single vector Q (which is not nec-
essarily revealed in plaintext to Alice) and, possibly using a Secure Multiparty
Computation (SMC). Alice reveals a response vector (r1, r2, . . . , rg), where each
ri is the score for some type of comparison of Q with Xi. In the simplest case,
each score ri can be a single bit denoting whether the query Q shares any com-
mon entries with Xi. As mentioned above, the risk to this data-cloning attack,
then, can be characterized by the number of queries and how much processing
time is needed so that Bob can replicate all of X or a large portion of X .
1.1 Our Contributions
Inspired by a game known as Mastermind, we present a number of algorithms
for performing a Mastermind attack on an entire string or vector database,
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xg), so as to clone all or a large portion of X . All of our
methods assume only the SMC protocol of Jiang et al. [8], where a querier,
Bob, issues a query string or vector, Q, and receives a vector of responses
(r1, r2, . . . , rg), where each ri is a single numerical response score measuring the
similarity of Q and Xi according to some public metric. Since vectors taken over
a universe of size c can be viewed as character strings taken over an alphabet
of size c, we will, without loss of generality, focus our descriptions on the case
when X consists of g character strings. We will also assume that each string in
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X is the same length, since we can view smaller strings as being padded with
an additional character not in the original alphabet.
We show that repeated querying of such a database can clone all or a large
portion of it, often with a surprisingly small, sublinear number of queries. The
risk profile we explore in each type of attack, then, is the number of queries
needed to execute it. Specifically, let us suppose that X contains g strings, each
of length n, taken over an alphabet of size c, with at least g′ ≤ g of these strings
having at most d < n differences from a public reference string, R. We show
that at least g′ of the strings in X can be cloned using (at most) the following
number of queries:
2(c− 1)(2d log n+ min{d log g, d2 log(en/d)}).
This result applies to situations, common in many real-world databases (e.g.
[1, 12, 2]), where strings in the database can be characterized in terms of a small
number of differences with a reference string, R.
We also provide several case studies showing empirical data that demon-
strates that our randomized attack can work effectively on real-world databases.
For instance, we apply our attack to a database of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
strings and the database of movie-ratings vectors provided for the Netflix Prize
contest, showing that large portions of these databases can be cloned using a
number of queries that is much smaller than the length of the strings or vectors
in these databases.
If, in practice, Bob learns more than the information contained in the re-
sponse vector (r1, r2, . . . , rg), that only strengthens his attack. The point of
this paper is that even with just the information leaked in the responses, Bob
can construct a small number of query vectors that are sufficient to learn all
or a sizeable fraction of the vectors in X . Moreover, our Mastermind attack is
oblivious (that is, nonadaptive), in that Bob can construct all his query vectors
in advance, so that the format of no query depends on the outcome of another.
We describe a randomized construction for Bob’s query vectors, which allows
the attack to be fairly surreptitious, in that each query looks random (because
it is random).
2 Attack Scenarios
Before describing our nonadaptive Mastermind attack in precise detail, we show
how it applies to a wide variety of attack scenarios to provide motivating exam-
ples. We illustrate three such attack scenarios below.
2.1 Genetic Signatures
Suppose the vectors in X represent the genetic signatures of people in some
population, such as a high school, college, or corporation. Bob’s goal in this
Mastermind attack is to learn the genetic signatures for as many people in his
population of interest as is reasonably possible. He can employ his attack so long
3
Figure 1: An illustration of the pattern of human migration together with major
mutations in human mtDNA [13, 14], which is only transfered along the maternal
line. Each letter stands for a set of mutations from the reference string, R. Thus,
determining locations of differences with R can reveal ethnic identity, sometimes
to the resolution of the village of maternal ancestry. (Image, Copyright 2009,
Michael T. Goodrich. Used with permission.)
as there is a website or tool for X that allows him to test a query vector Q against
the vectors in X to determine which ones share a mutation with Q, with respect
to a reference R. In mitochondrial DNA, the reference R is roughly 16,500 base
pairs long, but has only about 4,000 known mutations [15, 16], suggesting that
each vector in X is sparse relative to R.
In this example, Bob could be posing as a medical researcher and claim
that his vectors are testing for combinations of genetic markers for disease.
Alternatively he could claim to be a forensic analyst with DNA from a crime
scene, which he wants to test against members of X (in this case, he is likely to
receive a similarity score between his query Q and the vectors in X , which he can
easily convert into an overlap-detection bit). In either case, a minimum amount
of overlap information can allow him to learn the entire genetic signatures of a
large number of members of X .
The privacy implications of such an innocuous attack are significant. Alice’s
genetic signature could then be used by an unethical employer or insurance
company to discriminate against her based on his risks for future diseases. Also,
as illustrated in Figure 1, it is possible using a genetic signature derived from
a short string of Alice’s mitochondrial DNA to trace her maternal lineage to
an ancestral location [14, 13], which is information that could then be used for
ethnic discrimination [17].
2.2 Social Network Friendship Ties
Suppose the vectors in X represent the rows of the adjacency matrix (e.g., Fig-
ure 2) defined by the friendship ties for an online social network, like Facebook,
possibly restricted to the population in a specific city, college, high school, or
4
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1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 1 0 0
2 1 0 1 1 0
3 1 1 0 1 0
4 0 1 1 0 1
5 0 0 0 1 0
Figure 2: An example graph and its adjacency matrix.
large corporation. In this scenario, Bob wants to learn the friendship relation-
ships of as many people as possible. For instance, he may wish to do racial
profiling [18] or do a cross-networking identification attack [3], since 89% of
Facebook users use their real names [19].
In this case, Bob’s query vectors correspond to a relatively small number of
pseudonyms that Bob creates in the social network and for which he defines a
certain number of random friendship ties. For instance, he could create such
ties using automated social engineering techniques (e.g., using the name of an
affiliated city, college, etc.) as well as the property that a fairly large percent-
age of social networking users are likely to accept random friendship requests
from people in their community (roughly 10 to 25% of student Facebook users
accept random friendship requests from people who say they are in the same
university [20]). Given his set of pseudonyms, Bob employs the group-testing
attack by having each of his pseudonyms ask the social networking site if this
pseudonym shares any friends with the people in Bob’s population of interest.
Note that he will receive a useful response vector from everyone that has privacy
settings that allow for testing for mutual friends in common. That is, even if
someone chooses to share friendship information only with “friends of friends,”
which is one of the more restrictive standard privacy settings in Facebook, Bob
can still get valid responses for his queries with respect to such people. More-
over, if Bob employs an oblivious group-testing attack, he can use the same set
of pseudonyms for everyone whose privacy he is attacking. Thus, once he has
set up his pseudonyms, he can target the privacy of any user in the online social
network at will.
2.3 User Preference Data
Suppose the vectors in X represent the preferences of people in a site, such
as Amazon or Netflix, that employs collaborative filtering to support product
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recommendations. Specifically, we assume in this scenario that products are
numbered 1 to k and each vector Xi in X has a discrete rating (e.g. 1-5 stars,
or a missing rating) in position j, provided by user i. Bob’s goal in this scenario
is to discover as many vectors in X as reasonably possible and in so doing
discover the product preferences of a large number of targeted people. His
motivation could, for instance, be economic, in that he may want to open an
online store that caters to a specific demographic; hence, we may want to learn
the product preferences for a known population of people in this group. In
terms of information leakage, all that is needed in order to allow for Bob’s
group-testing attack to work is for the collaborative filtering site have a way
for him to create pseudonyms, have these pseudonyms rate products, and allow
for these pseudonyms to test if they share any ratings in common with users
in the target population. So long as the collaborative filtering web site allows
for users to check for overlapping scores with other users, Bob can employ the
nonadaptive Mastermind attack.
2.4 Exploiting Sparsity
The above set of attack scenarios are illustrative of the risks to privacy that
the group-testing attack provides, in that it can greatly amplify the information
gained from just a relatively small number of single-bit privacy leaks. The
risk to the group-testing attack can be characterized in terms of the number
of queries and how much processing time is needed so that Bob can replicate a
large portion of X . As we will elaborate in Section 4, the critical factor here is
a sparsity parameter, d, which, in a group testing context, refers to the small
number of “defective” items in the large group.
Interestingly, each of the attack scenarios mentioned above possess such a
parameter, allowing for Bob to employ efficient Mastermind attacks with a rel-
atively small number of queries. For example, an individual’s genetic signature
will typically have a relatively small number of indicators for mutations with
respect to a reference DNA string – with mitochondrial DNA, most people have
fewer than 100 mutations with respect to a commonly-used reference string.
Furthermore, most people in social networking sites, such as Facebook, have
less than a few hundred friends. Likewise, most collaborative filtering prefer-
ence vectors, such as in the Netflix Prize contest, have ratings for at most a few
hundred items. Thus, there are several modern contexts that have all the pieces
in place to allow for the Mastermind attack to be used.
It is worth noting that realistic attacks can also be constructed in many
other domains. For instance, sensitive image data, such as captured by biomet-
ric devices, may be represented as sparse vectors, making it susceptible to a
Mastermind attack, especially when efficient tools exist for comparing a query
(e.g. a fingerprint or an iris scan) to the entire database.
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Figure 3: The Mastermind game. The four large pegs in the middle are used
for guessing. The four smaller peg locations on the left are used to score each
guess—with black-peg and white-peg scores. (Image, Copyright 2009, Michael
T. Goodrich. Used with permission.)
3 Background and Related Work
We give a brief background of the Mastermind game and attacks inspired by
that game, as well as related work on privacy models and attempts to mitigate
privacy leaks.
3.1 Mastermind
Adapting the terminology of the Mastermind attack [21] to attacks on an entire
database, we discuss in this section the relationship between the Mastermind
attack and the Mastermind boardgame. Mastermind [22, 23] is a two-player
board game, which is played between a codemaker and a codebreaker, using
colored pegs (Figure 3). Mastermind begins with the codemaker selecting a
character string, X, of length n, using an alphabet of size c, whose members are
called “colors.” The codebreaker then makes a sequence of queries, Q1, Q2, . . .,
about X’s identity. For each guess Qi, the codemaker provides a score on
how well Qi matches X. In the board game, this is done using colored pegs,
but we assume in this paper that the score is simply a matching function,
b(Qi) = |{j : Qi[j] = X[j]}|, which counts the number of places where Qi and
X match. The codebreaker, of course, is trying to discover X using a small
number of guesses.
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Chva´tal [22] studied the combinatorics of the general Mastermind game,
showing that it can be solved in polynomial time using 2ndlog ce+ 4n guesses.
Chen et al. [24] showed how this can be improved to 2ndlog ne+ 2n+ dc/ne+ 2
guesses and Goodrich [25] showed how this bound can be improved to ndlog ce+
d(2−1/c)ne+c. Unfortunately, from the perspective of the cloning problem, all
of these algorithms are adaptive, in that they use results of previous queries to
construct future queries. Adaptive algorithms can only be used effectively for
the interactions between a single pair of strings. For a sequence of queries to be
used against an entire database of strings, we need a nonadaptive algorithm, that
is, an algorithm where queries are not dependent upon answers from previous
queries, which is equivalent to the codebreaker making all his guesses in advance.
Chva´tal [22] also gives an existence proof for a nonadaptive method for solv-
ing Mastermind. If the number of possible colors, c ≤ n1−, for some constant
 > 0, which will almost always be the case for biological databases, Chva´tal
shows the existence of a nonadaptive method using only
G = (2 + )n
1 + 2 log c
log n− log c
guesses. In fact, he shows that making G guesses at random will be sufficient
to determine a unique solution with high probability, using only the b(Qi) type
of scores. Unfortunately, this existence proof does not immediately lead to a
polynomial-time algorithm. Indeed, it is NP-complete to determine if a col-
lection of Mastermind guesses with b(Qi) type of responses is satisfiable [25].
Nonetheless, in this paper, we will show that Mastermind attacks based on re-
ductions to group testing can efficiently clone a sparse database of interest using
a sublinear number of nonadaptive queries.
3.2 Related Privacy Models
Following a framework by Bancilhon and Spyratos [26], Deutsch and Papakon-
stantinou [27] and Miklau and Suciu [28] give related models for characterizing
privacy loss in information releases from a database, which they call query-view
security. In this framework, there is a secret, S, that the data owner, Alice, is
trying to protect. Attackers are allowed to ask legal queries of the database,
while Alice tries to protect the information that these queries leak about S.
While this framework is related to the data-cloning attack, these two are not
identical, since in the data-cloning attack there is no specifically sensitive part
of the data. Instead, Alice, is trying to limit releasing too much of her data
to Bob rather than protecting any specific secret. Similarly, Kantarciogˇlu et
al. [29] study privacy models that quantify the degree to which data mining
searches expose private information, but this related privacy model is also not
directly applicable to the data-cloning attack.
There has been considerable recent work on data modification approaches
that can help protect the privacy or intellectual property rights of a database
by modifying its content. For example, several researchers (e.g., see [30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35]) advocate the use of data watermarking to protect data rights. In
8
using this technique, data values are altered to make it easier, after the fact,
to track when someone has stolen information from a database. Of course,
by that point, the data has already been cloned. Alternatively, several other
researchers (e.g., [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]) propose using generalization
or cell suppression as methods for achieving quantifiable privacy-preservation
in databases. These techniques alter data values to protect sensitive parts of
the data, while still allowing for data mining activities to be performed on the
database. We assume here that Alice is not interested in data modification tech-
niques, however, for we believe that accuracy is critically important in several
database applications. For example, even a single base-pair mutation in a DNA
string can indicate the existence of an increased health risk.
As mentioned above, we allow for the queries Bob asks to be answered us-
ing SMC protocols, which reveal no additional information between the query
string Q and each database string Xi other than the response score ri. Such
protocols have been developed for the kinds of comparisons that are done in
genomic sequences (e.g., see [4, 44, 45]). In particular, Atallah et al. [4] and
Atallah and Li [46] studied privacy-preserving protocols for edit-distance se-
quence comparisons, such as in the longest common subsequence (LCS) prob-
lem (e.g., [47, 48, 49]). Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. [50] described a privacy-
preserving protocol for regular-expression searching in a DNA sequence. Jha
et al. [7] give privacy-preserving protocols for computing edit distance and
Smith-Waterman similarity scores between two genomic sequences, improving
the privacy-preserving algorithm of Szajda et al. [9]. Aligned matching results
between two strings can be done in a privacy-preserving manner, as well, using
privacy-preserving set intersection protocols (e.g., see [51, 45, 52, 10, 53]) or
SMC methods for dot products (e.g., see [6, 54, 11]). In addition, the Fairplay
system [5] provides a general compiler for building such computations.
Du and Atallah [55] study an SMC protocol for querying a string Q in a
database of strings, X , as in our framework, where comparisons are based on
approximate matching (but not sequence-alignment). Their SMC protocols for
performing such queries provide a best match, not a score for each string in the
database. Thus, their scheme would not be applicable in the attack framework
we are considering in this paper. The SMC method of Jiang et al. [8], on the
other hand, is directly applicable. It provides a vector of scores comparing a
string (or vector) Q to a sequence of strings (or vectors), as we require in this
paper. Thus, our Mastermind methods can be viewed as an attack on repeated
use of the SMC protocol of Jiang et al.
Goodrich [21] studies the problem of discovering a single DNA string from
a series of genomic Mastermind queries. All his methods are sequential and
adaptive, however, so the only way they could be applied to the data-cloning
attack on an entire biological database is if Bob were to focus on each string
Xi in X in turn. That is, he would have to gear his queries to specifically
discovering each Xi in n distinct “rounds” of computation, each of which uses a
lot of string-comparison queries. Such an adaptation of Goodrich’s Mastermind
attacks to perform data cloning, therefore, would be prohibitively expensive for
Bob. Our approach, instead, is based on performing a nonadaptive Mastermind
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attack on the entire database at once.
We note that others have investigated de-anonymization techniques on both
social networks [56] and Netflix data [57]. These works are complementary to
our goal of cloning the databases themselves.
4 Exploiting Sparsity in an Algorithmic Data-
Cloning Attack
In this section, we describe the details of our nonadapative Mastermind data-
cloning attack. It is often the case that all or a large fraction of the strings in
a real-world string database can be characterized in terms of a small number of
differences with a public reference string. In these situations, which are quite
common, we can apply a reduction to nonadaptive group testing, which results
in an an efficient Mastermind attack as we will see.
4.1 Non-adaptive Combinatorial Group Testing
Group testing was introduced by Dorfman [58], during World War II, to test
blood samples. The problem he addressed was to design an efficient way to
detect the few thousand blood samples that were contaminated with syphilis
out of the millions that were collected. His idea was to pool drops of blood
from multiple samples and test each pool for the syphilis antigen. By carefully
arranging the group tests and then discovering which groups tested positive and
which ones tested negative he could then identify the contaminated samples
using a small number of group tests (much smaller than the number needed
to explicitly test each individual blood sample), thereby sparing thousands of
G.I.’s from needless disease exposure. In this paper, we show that Dorfman’s
humanitarian discovery has an unfortunate dark side when it comes to privacy
protection, for it enables privacy leaks to be amplified in a data-cloning attack.
In the combinatorial group testing problem (e.g., Du and Hwang [59]), one is
given a set S of n items, at most d of which are “defective,” for some parameter
d ≤ n, and one is interested in exactly determining which of the items in S
are defective. One can form a test from any subset T of S and in a single step
determine if T contains any defective items or not. If one can use information
from the result of a test in formulating the tests to make in the future, then the
method is said to be adaptive. If, on the other hand, one cannot use the results
from one test to determine the makeup of any future test, then the method is
said to be nonadaptive. For the application to the Mastermind attack, we are
interested in nonadaptive methods.
There are several existing nonadaptive group testing methods [59], but these
approaches are meant for a more general context than in our database cloning
attack. In particular, these methods are designed to work for any set of items
having d defective members. In our case, we are instead interested in specific
sets of items that are derived from the database we are interested in cloning.
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Because of this, we can, in fact, derive improved bounds than would be implied
by existing combinatorial group-testing methods.
Suppose we are given a collection, C, of sets, C = {S1, S2, . . . , Sg}, which are
not necessarily distinct, such that each set Si contains n items, at most d of
which are “defective.” We want to design a nonadaptive group testing scheme
that can exactly identify the subset, Di, of at most d defective items in each
set Si in C. Our approach to solving this problem is based on a randomized
approach used by Eppstein et al. [60].
A nonadaptive group testing algorithm can actually be viewed as a t×n 0-1
matrix, M . Each of the n columns of M corresponds to one of the n items and
each of the t rows of M represents a test. If M [i, j] = 1, then item j is included
in test i, and if M [i, j] = 0, then item j is not included in test i. Since this is a
nonadaptive testing scheme, we assume that no test depends on the results of
any other. That is, every row of the matrix M is defined in advance of any test
outcomes. The analysis question, then, is to determine how large t must be for
the results of these tests to provide useful results.
Let C denote the set of columns of M . Given a subset D of d columns in
M , and a specific column j in C but not in D, we say that j is distinguishable
from D if there is a row i of M such that M [i, j] = 1 but i contains a 0 in
each of the columns in D. If each column of M that is in C and not in D is
distinguishable from D, then we say that M is D-distinguishing. Furthermore,
we generalize this definition, so that if M is Di-distinguishing for each subset,
Di, in a collection, D = {D1, D2, . . . , Dg}, of columns in C, then we say that
M is D-distinguished. Finally, we say that the matrix M is d-disjunct (e.g., see
Du and Hwang [59], p. 165) if it is D-distinguished for the collection, D, of all
of the
(
n
d
)
subsets of size d of C.
Note that if M is D-distinguishing, then it leads to a simple testing algorithm
with respect to D. In particular, suppose D is the set of defective items and we
perform all the tests in M . Note that, since M is D-distinguishing, if an item
j is not in D, then there is a test in M that will determine the item j is not
defective, for j would belong to a test that must necessarily have no defective
items. So we can identify D in this case—the set D consists of all items that
have no test determining them to be nondefective.
Of course, if M is d-disjunct, then this simple detection algorithm works
for any set D of up to d defective items in C. Unfortunately, building such a
matrix M that is d-disjunct requires M to have Ω(d2 log n/ log d) rows [59, 61].
So we will instead build a matrix that is D-distinguished for the collection, D,
of defective subsets determined by the sets of items in C, with high probability.
Given a parameter t, which is a multiple of d, we construct a 2t× n matrix
M as follows. For each column j of M , we choose t/d rows uniformly at random
and we set the values of these entries to 1, with the other entries in column
j being set to 0. Note, then, that for any set D of up to d defective items,
there are at most t tests that will have positive outcomes (detecting defectives)
and, therefore, at least t tests that will have negative outcomes. Our desire, of
course, is for columns that correspond to samples that are distinguishable from
the defectives ones should belong to at least one negative-outcome test. So, let
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us focus on bounds for t that allow for such a matrix M to be chosen with high
probability.
Let C be a set of (column) items having a fixed subset D of d defective
items. For each (column) item j in C but not in D, let Yj denote the 0-1
random variable that is 1 if j is falsely identified as a defective item by M (that
is, j is not included in a test of items distinguished from those in D). Let Yj
be 0 otherwise. Observe that the Yj ’s are independent, since Yj depends only
on whether the choice of rows we picked for column j collide with the at most
t rows of M picked for the columns corresponding to items in D. There are a
total of 2t rows, at most t of which contain a test with a defective item. Thus,
the probability of any non-defective item joining any particular test having a
defective item in it is at most 1/2; hence, any Yj is 1 (a false positive) with
probability at most 2−t/d, since each item is included in t/d tests at random.
Let Y =
∑n
j=1 Yj , and note that the expected value of Y , E(Y ), is at most
µˆ = n/2t/d. Thus, if µˆ ≤ 1, we can use Markov’s inequality to bound the
probability of the (bad) case when Y is non-zero as follows:
Pr(Y ≥ 1) ≤ E(Y ) ≤ µˆ = n
2t/d
.
Thus, if we set
t ≥ 2d log n,
then M will be D-distinguishing with probability at least 1 − 1/n, for any
particular subset of defective items, D, from a set C of n items. Likewise, if we
set
t ≥ 2d log n+ d log g,
then M will be D-distinguished, with probability at least 1 − 1/n, for the col-
lection of g subsets of defective items determined by the sets in C. Finally, we
can use the fact (e.g., see Knuth [62]) that(
n
d
)
< (en/d)d,
so that if we set
t ≥ 2d log n+ d2 log(en/d),
then M will be d-disjunct with probability at least 1 − 1/n, which implies M
will work for any subset of at most d defective items. Therefore, we have the
following.
Theorem 1. If
t ≥ 2d log n+ min{d log g, d2 log(en/d)},
then a 2t×n random matrix M , constructed as described above, is D-distinguished,
with probability at least 1−1/n, for any given collection, D = {D1, D2, . . . , Dg},
of g subsets of size d of the n columns in M .
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Proof. Let D be a given collection of g (not necessarily distinct) subsets of size
d of the n columns in M . If
d2 log(en/d) > d log g,
then M is D-distinguished by construction, with probability at least 1 − 1/n.
If, on the other hand,
d2 log(en/d) ≤ d log g,
then M constructed as above is d-disjunct, with probability at least 1 − 1/n,
which implies it is D-distinguished w.h.p. for any collection D of subsets of size
d of the n columns of M .
As mentioned above, this is a way of constructing a simple nonadaptive
group testing method for identifying the defective items in the collection, D, of
subsets of up to d defective items determined by the sets in C.
4.2 Reducing Mastermind to Group Testing
In this section, we describe how to use nonadaptive group testing to construct
an efficient Mastermind cloning attack. Consider the case when X is a database
of g strings of length n each, with each of them having at most d ≤ n differences
with a reference string R. We assume that each string in X is drawn from
an alphabet of c characters, which, without loss of generality, we assume are
integers in the range [0, c− 1].
Suppose, like before, that we have a 2t×n nonadaptive group testing matrix,
M , for a set of size n having at most d defectives, where
t ≥ 2d log n+ min{log g, d2 log(en/d)}.
As before, we begin our general Mastermind cloning attack by making a query
for the reference string, R. Let r be the response score for the query for R.
Next, we create c− 1 different string queries, Qk,l for each of the 2t tests in M ,
defined, for l = 1, 2, . . . , c− 1, as follows:
Qk,l[j] =
{
R[j] if M [k, j] = 0
(R[j] + l) mod c else.
Each such query against a string Xi will have some response, rk,l,i. We interpret
test (k, l, i) as having a “positive” response, that is, it does not detect a defective,
if, in making the comparison of Qk,l with the string Xi, the response
rk,l,i = r − bk,0,i,
where bk,0,i is the number of characters in Xi matching their associated (color-0)
location in R at places where there are 1’s in row k of M . Intuitively, each 1
in row k of M indicates a place where we test a deviation from the reference
value in R at that location to the color l away. If none of these locations is
a match with the current Xi string, then none of these locations take a color
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that is l additive colors from their reference value. In other words, defective
“items” in the associated group testing method correspond to locations where
Xi differs from the reference string with characters that are exactly l away from
their reference values.
Of course, being able to determine if such a test for Qk,l against string Xi is
“positive” or “negative” requires that we know the value bk,0,i, which we don’t
immediately know. We do immediately know the number, bk, of 1’s in row
k of M , however. And, after we perform the queries for each Qk,l against a
string Xi, we learn each response rk,l,i. That is, we have c linear equations in
c unknowns from these queries and their responses. Specifically, we have the
equation, bk = bk,0,i + bk,1,i + · · · + bk,c−1,i, where bk,l,i denotes the number of
places j where there is a 1 in row k of M and the character in position j of Xi
is l away from the reference, that is, places where X[j] = (R[j] + l) mod c and
M [k, j] = 1. We also have c− 1 equations,
rk,l,i = r − bk,0,i + bk,l,i,
for l = 1, 2, . . . , c − 1, which can each be rewritten as bk,l,i = rk,l,i − r + bk,0,i.
This allows us to rewrite
bk = c bk,0,i − (c− 1)r +
c−1∑
l=1
rk,l,i.
Thus, we can determine the value of bk,0,i as
bk,0,i =
bk + (c− 1)r −
∑c−1
l=1 rk,l,i
c
,
which in turn tells us which of the Qk,l tests are “positive” and which ones are
“negative.” Essentially, we are performing a combinatorial group test for each
possible shift we can make from a color in reference R.
Thus, if there are at most d locations where Xi differs from the reference
string and M is D-distinguished for the set of at most d locations of difference
for each string in X , then this scheme will learn the complete identity of each
string in X . That is, this method will clone X , with high probability. Therefore,
by Theorem 1, we have the following:
Theorem 2. Given a database X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xg), of strings of length n
defined over an alphabet of size c, there is a nonadaptive Mastermind cloning
method that can discover each string in X , using 2t(c−1) tests, with probability
at least 1− (c− 1)/n, where t is the smallest multiple of d such that
t ≥ 2d log n+ min{d log g, d2 log(en/d)},
and d ≤ n is the maximum number of differences any string in X has with R.
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5 Case Studies
To test the real-world risks of the nonadaptive Mastermind cloning attack, we
applied our methods to case studies involving random samples from a number
of real-world string and vector databases, including genomic and social network
data. We briefly describe the data sets used and then discuss experimental
results which reveal that relatively few tests are needed to recover large propor-
tions of each database.
Name Strings Length Max Diff Colors
Genomic 457 16,568 492 4
Netflix 1,000 17,700 1988 6
Epinions 2,000 131,827 517 3
Slashdot 2,000 82,144 378 3
Slashdot (All) 82,144 82,144 428 3
Facebook-UNC 18,163 18,163 3,795 2
Facebook-Unif 1,000 72,261,577 2,164 2
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Figure 4: Data sets used in experiments, along with histograms of differences
from reference R. These data sets have varying characteristics.
5.1 Data Sets
We analyze several different data sets with varying characteristics to test our
approach. For each data set, Figure 4 shows the number of strings g, string
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length n, maximum difference d from the reference R across strings (where
“difference” is defined as the number of entries in which the string differs from
R), and the number of unique colors c present in the database.
The Genomic database consists of 457 human mitochondrial sequences down-
loadable from GenBank1. We use the Revised Cambridge Reference Sequence
(rCRS), of length 16,586 bp as the reference string R. Figure 4 shows the distri-
bution of sequence differences from R, which reveals that the differences from R
are relatively few and are concentrated at several different modes. In this data,
there are four colors, namely the nucleotides A, C, T, and G.
Our movie-rating database is taken from the Netflix Prize data2, which con-
sists of 100 million movie ratings and 480,189 different Netflix users. In our
experiments, we use a representative subset of 1,000 randomly selected users.
Each user has an associated string over 17,770 movies, where each position i
stores the rating (from 1 to 5) given by the user for movie i. An entry of 0
signifies that the user has not rated that movie. Thus, there are six different
unique colors in this database (0-5). Our reference string R consists of all ze-
ros, representing the case where no movies are rated. According to Figure 4,
the majority of users rate less than 300 movies. This sparsity allows the group
testing attacks to be very efficient, as we will see in the experiments.
We also analyze online social networks such as Epinions, Slashdot, and Face-
book. Available from the SNAP Library3, Epinions and Slashdot are “signed”
networks, where positive and negative links appear in the network’s adjacency
matrix [63]. The Epinions network is the site’s “Web of Trust” where users
specify the other users that they trust or distrust. Similarly, in the Slashdot
network, users can specify both “friends” and “foes”. Hence, in both these
databases, there are three unique colors: 0 (no link), 1 (good link), and -1 (bad
link). In our experiments for both Epinions and Slashdot, we select a random
subset of 2,000 users and utilize the corresponding rows in the adjacency matrix
as our database. We also simulate a single large-scale group testing attack on
the entire Slashdot-All adjaency matrix with 82,144 users.
The two Facebook data sets that we analyze are Facebook-Uniform and
Facebook-UNC. Facebook-Uniform, provided by the authors of [64], is an unbi-
ased sample of 957K unique users obtained by performing Metropolis-Hastings
random walks over the Facebook network. Each user is associated with a
(sparse) binary vector of size 72 million which denotes adjacencies. We restrict
ourselves to a random subset of 1,000 users in Facebook-Uniform. Meanwhile,
Facebook-UNC is a self-contained Facebook network of approximately 18,000
students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill [65].
For all the social network data sets, we use a reference string R of all zeros.
Figure 4 shows that these networks are also sparse, which is often the case in
many real-world settings.
1http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genbank/index.html
2http://www.netflixprize.com
3http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html#signnets
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Table 1: Theoretical number of tests needed to clone entire database (a) by
baseline method (b) by nonadaptive Mastermind attack.
Baseline Mastermind
Genomic 49,704 76,752
Netflix 88,500 536,760
Epinions 263,654 66,176
Slashdot 164,288 46,872
Slashdot (All) 164,288 58,208
Facebook-UNC 18,163 227,700
Facebook-Uniform 72,261,577 190,432
5.2 Experiments
Our experimental approach is based on the analysis in Section 4. Similar to
randomly selecting td rows from 2t rows (for each column in the nonadaptive
group matrix M), we stochastically set each entry in M to 1 with probability
p = 12d . This procedure enables us to add additional tests to M until the string
is cloned or until a cutoff of 100, 000 ∗ c tests is reached, where c is the number
of unique colors in the database. We initialize with the same random seed for
each string, ensuring that the same exact tests are performed on each string.
This scheme allows us to determine the actual number of tests needed to clone
the strings.
Before delving into the experimental results, we report in Table 1 the theo-
retical number of tests needed to clone the entire database with high probability,
using the nonadaptive Mastermind technique. These numbers are based on n,
g, d, c, and the bound in Theorem 2. Table 1 also shows the number of tests
needed by a baseline technique to exactly clone the entire database. This base-
line technique generates tests based on the reference R. For each entry j within
R, and for each color offset l, a test is created where the entry j in R is replaced
with its color offset l, namely (R[j]+l) mod c. Thus, the baseline method needs
(c − 1) ∗ n tests to recover the database. Interestingly, the baseline technique
can beat the theoretical bound (with d) when n is small, as is the case for the
Genomic, Netflix, and Facebook-UNC data.
Fortunately, our Mastermind attack can take advantage of the sparsity in
the data to improve its efficiency. Since each string’s distance from R is usually
much smaller than d, it is empirically advantageous to use a target dˆ that is
much smaller than d. For instance, the Netflix data has a maximum difference
d = 1988, but the mean difference from R is dmean = 202 and the median is
dmedian = 92. Thus, there are different possible choices for dˆ.
For each data set (excluding Slashdot-All and Facebook-Uniform due to
their large scale), Figure 5 shows the number of tests needed to exactly clone a
string (averaged across all strings in the database), as a function of dˆ. In a few
instances, when the strings are very far from R, the algorithm may reach the
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Figure 5: Mean and median number of tests required until string is cloned
(averaged across all strings in database), for various settings of target distance
dˆ. Typically, it is advantageous to set dˆ to be much less than d, since most of
the vectors are sparse and are close to the reference R.
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Figure 6: Number of tests required to clone each string, ordered by the string’s
distance from R. Each string is represented by a dot. While the number of tests
increases rapidly for small dˆ when the vector is far from R, note that many
vectors are close to R, allowing for a majority of the database to be captured
quickly.
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Figure 7: Error as a function of the number of tests for a single Netflix user
who has rated 68 movies, for various dˆ.
cutoff value, causing the mean to be undervalued; thus, we also plot the median
number of tests since the median is more robust to outliers. Generally, we see
that mean and median number of required tests decreases as dˆ is decreased from
d. For instance, for the Slashdot database, the mean/median number of tests is
18,000 if dˆ = d = 378, but if dˆ = 50, the mean/median number of tests is 3,000
and if dˆ = dmean = 13, the median number of tests requred is 700. Sometimes,
the mean number of tests increases if dˆ is too small though. If dˆ = dmean = 13,
the mean number of tests required is around 4,000. Thus, there is a tradeoff.
If dˆ is too small, it would take longer to exactly clone a string that is far away
from R. If dˆ is too large (e.g. dˆ = d), then many inefficient tests would be
performed on strings that are close to R. We assume that a good estimate for
dˆ (such as the median distance from R) can be obtained a priori, e.g. through
scientific knowledge in the case of the Genomic database, or publicly available
information in the cases of Netflix, Epinions, Slashdot, and Facebook.
We also investigate the relationship between the number of required tests
and the vector’s distance from R. In Figure 6, we observe that the number
of tests required to clone a vector is very low (and nearly constant) when the
vector’s distance from R is itself low and close to dˆ. As the vector’s distance
increases, the number of required tests grows more quickly due to the mismatch
between the distance and dˆ. For each data set, we display different scatter plots
for different settings of dˆ. For instance, for the Slashdot data, the number of
tests is relatively constant across all distances when the dˆ = 200; however, at
this setting, the number of required tests is at least 10,000, even when the vector
is close to the reference R. In contrast, when dˆ = 3, the number of required tests
is only in the hundreds, around the vicinity of dˆ; however, when the vector’s
distance from R is significantly greater (e.g. over 100), the scatter plot increases
dramatically. It is important to note that most vectors are close to R due to
the sparsity of the data, and thus, even when the scatter plot dramatically
increases when the distance from R is great, there are relatively few vectors
that fall within this regime.
Providing another perspective, Figure 7 shows the decrease in error (defined
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as the number of differences between the string and the state of the reconstructed
string) as the number of tests increases, for a randomly selected Netflix user
who has rated 68 movies. One can see that using dˆ = 202 induces a slower
rate of convergence than when using smaller settings for dˆ. The case where
dˆ = d = 1988 is not shown since its rate of convergence is even slower.
In Figure 8, the percentage of the database cloned by the nonadaptive Mas-
termind attack is plotted as a function of the number of tests, for various dˆ.
We highlight some examples which demonstrate the efficiency of this attack.
For the Genomic data (using dˆ = dmedian = 18), 78% of the database is suc-
cessfully recovered after 2,000 tests, and over 99% of the database is recovered
after 3,000 tests, which is significantly less than both the baseline result and the
theoretical bound in Table 1. For the Netflix data (using dˆ = dmedian = 92),
63% of the strings are recovered after 10,000 tests. For the Epinions data (using
dˆ = dmean = 8), 68% of the strings are recovered after only 500 tests. For the
Slashdot data (using dˆ = dmean = 13) 82% of the strings are recovered after
only 1,000 tests.
For Facebook-UNC, we see that the Mastermind attack displays different
behavior for different choices of dˆ. When dˆ = 3, the attack is able to quickly
recover (the sparsest) 15% of the data set after only 500 tests, but as the number
of tests increases, the rate of progress slows significantly. When dˆ = 25, 52% of
the database has been successfully recovered after 2000 tests. Thus, using only
a couple thousand nonadaptive tests, we are able to clone the friend lists of half
(9K out of 18K) of the Facebook users at the University of North Carolina.
We also performed a large-scale nonadaptive Mastermind attack on Slashdot-
All with 82,144 users. Figure 9 shows that 55% of the strings are recovered after
2,500 tests and that 81% of the strings are recovered after 4,000 tests, using
dˆ = 50. Even when using a dˆ which may be suboptimal, our empirical results
suggest that it is possible to substantially outperform both the baseline method
as well the theoretical bounds in Table 1 in practice, as long as dˆ is chosen to
be less than d.
We also ran the same experiment on Facebook-Uniform for dˆ = 108 (the
median distance from R). Figure 9 shows that over 70% of the data set can be
reconstructed with 10,000 tests, despite the fact that the vector length of this
data set is huge (n = 2, 261, 577). Since Facebook-Uniform contains an unbiased
sample of users, these users are representative of the global Facebook population.
Furthermore, our theory states that the number of required tests increases at
a rate of at most log(g) where g is the number of Facebook users. In fact,
the theoretical number of tests needed to guarantee that 50% of a 300-million
user Facebook network is cloned is less than 20,000 (assuming dmedian = 130)
4.
These results imply that an attacker may be able to recover over half of the
global Facebook social network with several thousands of seemingly innocuous
nonadaptive Mastermind queries.
4According to http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics, dmean = 130, and
so dmedian should be even smaller, suggesting that the Mastermind attack can be even more
efficient.
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Figure 8: Percentage of strings cloned as a function of the number of tests, for
each data set, using various dˆ.
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Figure 9: Percentage of strings cloned as a function of the number of tests, for
the large-scale data sets. Slashdot-All has a large number of strings (g = 82, 144)
while Facebook-Uniform has large vector length (n = 72, 261, 577).
It is worth noting that experiments have also been conducted on a variety
of other data sets not mentioned in this paper – the nonadaptive Mastermind
attack also performs very well on those data sets. Results on cloning databases
of binary attribute vectors (i.e. where the number of colors c = 2) are described
in previous work [66].
Our empirical results have shown that there is sensitivity to the choice of dˆ
in certain cases. One possible improvement is to use a tiered approach, where
dˆ1 is used to construct the first 5000 tests, dˆ2 is used to construct the next
5000 tests, etc. Each dˆi could correspond to different mode. Nonetheless, even
when using a single dˆ, our results demonstrate that it is possible to clone a large
fraction of a sparse database, by simply performing a nonadaptive Mastermind
attack.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the Mastermind cloning attack, both from a theoretical and ex-
perimental perspective, and have shown its effectiveness in being able to copy the
contents of a string database through a sublinear number of string-comparison
queries. Furthermore, our approach benefits from being fully nonadaptive and
surreptitious in nature (due to the randomized query construction), which is
useful in real-world settings.
A natural direction for future work, of course, is on methods for defeating
our nonadaptive Mastermind attack, which we have not addressed in this pa-
per. Certainly, having Alice randomly permute the responses from her database
with each query could help, since it would make it harder (but not necessarily
impossible) for Bob to correlate responses between different queries. Of course,
requiring Alice to always randomly permute her responses would take extra
time, and it may also require additional space if she needs to store every re-
sponse query so that users can refer back to her responses for other, limited
types of selection queries she may allow. So the technique of using random per-
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mutations can reduce the risks associated with the Mastermind cloning attack,
but it doesn’t necessarily eliminate these risks, and it comes with additional
costs.
Acknowledgements
A shorter version of the material in this paper (which only dealt with binary at-
tribute vectors) was presented by the authors at the ACM Workshop on Privacy
in the Electronic Society (WPES), Chicago, October 2010. We would like to
thank Pierre Baldi and Padhraic Smyth for respectively suggesting the privacy
of genomic data and Facebook relationships as research topics. We are also
grateful to Athina Markopoulou and Minas Gjokas for providing the Facebook-
Uniform data. We would also like to acknowledge David Eppstein and Daniel
Hirschberg for helpful discussions regarding the group-testing topics of this pa-
per. This research was supported by Office of Naval Research under MURI
grant N00014-08-1-1015 and by the National Science Foundation under grants
0724806, 0713046, 0847968, and an NSF Graduate Fellowship.
References
[1] P. Baldi, R. W. Benz, D. Hirschberg, and S. Swamidass, “Lossless compres-
sion of chemical fingerprints using integer entropy codes improves storage
and retrieval,” Journal of Chemical Information and Modeling, vol. 47,
no. 6, pp. 2098–2109, 2007.
[2] S. Swamidass and P. Baldi, “Bounds and algorithms for exact searches of
chemical fingerprints in linear and sub-linear time,” Journal of Chemical
Information and Modeling, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 302–317, 2007.
[3] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing social networks,” in
SP ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2009, pp. 173–
187.
[4] M. J. Atallah, F. Kerschbaum, and W. Du, “Secure and private sequence
comparisons,” in WPES ’03: ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic
Society, 2003, pp. 39–44.
[5] A. Ben-David, N. Nisan, and B. Pinkas, “FairplayMP - a system for se-
cure multi-party computation,” in ACM Symp. on Computer and Comm.
Security (CCS), 2008, pp. 257–266.
[6] I. Damg˚ard, M. Fitzi, E. Kiltz, J. B. Nielsen, and T. Toft, “Unconditionally
secure constant-rounds multi-party computation for equality, comparison,
bits and exponentiation,” in Theory of Cryptography, ser. LNCS, S. Halevi
and T. Rabin, Eds., vol. 3876. Springer, 2006, pp. 285–304.
24
[7] S. Jha, L. Kruger, and V. Shmatikov, “Towards practical privacy for ge-
nomic computation,” in IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, 2008, pp.
216–230.
[8] W. Jiang, M. Murugesan, C. Clifton, and L. Si, “Similar document detec-
tion with limited information disclosure,” in International Conference on
Data Engineering. IEEE, 2008, pp. 735–743.
[9] D. Szajda, M. Pohl, J. Owen, and B. G. Lawson, “Toward a practical data
privacy scheme for a distributed implementation of the Smith-Waterman
genome sequence comparison algorithm,” in Network and Distributed Sys-
tem Security (NDSS), 2006.
[10] Y. Sang and H. Shen, “Privacy preserving set intersection protocol secure
against malicious behaviors,” in 8th Int. Conf. on Parallel and Distributed
Computing, Applications and Technologies (PDCAT), 2007, pp. 461–468.
[11] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in 23rd Symp. on Foun-
dations of Computer Science (FOCS), 1982, pp. 160–164.
[12] D. S. Hirschberg and P. Baldi, “Effective compression of monotone and
quasi-monotone sequences of integers,” in Proceedings of the 2008 Data
Compression Conference (DCC 08). Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer
Society Press, 2008, in press.
[13] B. Pakendorf and M. Stoneking, “Mitochondrial DNA and human evolu-
tion,” Annual Rev. Genomics Hum. Genet., vol. 6, pp. 165–183, 2005.
[14] D. M. Behar1, S. Rosset, J. Blue-Smith, O. Balanovsky, S. Tzur1,
D. Comas, R. J. Mitchell, L. Quintana-Murci, C. Tyler-Smith, and
R. S. Wells, “The genographic project public participation mito-
chondrial DNA database,” PLoS Genetics, vol. 3, no. 6, 2005,
doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.0030104.
[15] M. Brandon, M. Lott, K. Nguyen, S. Spolim, S. Navathe, P. Baldi, and
D. Wallace, “MITOMAP: a human mitochondrial genome database - 2004
update,” Nucleic Acids Research, vol. 33, pp. D611–D613, 2005, database
Issue.
[16] E. Ruiz-Pesini, M. T. Lott, V. Procaccio, J. Poole, M. C. Brandon, D. Mish-
mar, C. Yi, J. Kreuziger, P. Baldi, and D. C. Wallace, “An enhanced
MITOMAP with a global mtDNA mutational philogeny,” Nucleic Acids
Research, vol. 35, pp. D823–D828, 2007, database Issue.
[17] S. Harihara, M. Hirai, Y. Suutou, K. Shimizu, and K. Omoto, “Frequency
of a 9-bp deletion in the mitochondrial DNA among Asian populations,”
Human Biology, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 161–166, 1992.
25
[18] K. Lewis, J. Kaufman, M. Gonzalez, A. Wimmer, and N. Christakis,
“Tastes, ties, and time: A new social network dataset using Facebook.com,”
Social Networks, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 330–342, 2008.
[19] R. Gross, A. Acquisti, and H. J. Heinz, III, “Information revelation and
privacy in online social networks,” in WPES ’05: 2005 ACM Workshop on
Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM, 2005, pp. 71–80.
[20] L. A. Stern and K. Taylor, “Social networking on Facebook,” Journal of the
Communication, Speech & Theatre Association of North Dakota, vol. 20,
pp. 9–20, 2007.
[21] M. T. Goodrich, “The mastermind attack on genomic data,” in IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Press, 2009, p. to appear.
[22] V. Chva´tal, “Mastermind,” Combinatorica, vol. 3, no. 3/4, pp. 325–329,
1983.
[23] D. Knuth, “The computer as a master mind,” Journal of Recreational
Math., vol. 9, pp. 1–5, 1977.
[24] Z. Chen, C. Cunha, and S. Homer, “Finding a hidden code by asking
questions,” in 2nd Int. Conf. on Comp. and Combinatorics (COCOON),
ser. LNCS, vol. 1090, 1996, pp. 50–55.
[25] M. T. Goodrich, “On the algorithmic complexity of the Mastermind game
with black-peg results,” Information Processing Letters, vol. 109, no. 13,
pp. 675–678, 2009.
[26] F. Bancilhon and N. Spyratos, “Protection of information in relational data
bases,” in VLDB ’77: Proceedings of the Third International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases, 1977, pp. 494–500.
[27] A. Deutsch and Y. Papakonstantinou, “Privacy in database publishing,” in
ICDT, ser. LNCS, T. Eiter and L. Libkin, Eds. Springer, 2005, vol. 3363,
pp. 230–245.
[28] G. Miklau and D. Suciu, “A formal analysis of information disclosure in
data exchange,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 73, no. 3,
pp. 507–534, 2007.
[29] M. Kantarciogˇlu, J. Jin, and C. Clifton, “When do data mining results
violate privacy?” in KDD ’04: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2004, pp. 599–604.
[30] R. Agrawal and J. Kiernan, “Watermarking relational databases,” in VLDB
’02: Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Very Large Data
Bases. VLDB Endowment, 2002, pp. 155–166.
26
[31] R. Agrawal, P. J. Haas, and J. Kiernan, “A system for watermarking rela-
tional databases,” in SIGMOD ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMOD
International Conference on Management of Data. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2003, pp. 674–674.
[32] D. Gross-Amblard, “Query-preserving watermarking of relational
databases and XML documents,” in PODS ’03: Proceedings of the
Twenty-Second ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Database Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2003, pp.
191–201.
[33] G. Schulz and M. Voigt, “A high capacity watermarking system for digital
maps,” in MM&Sec ’04: Proceedings of the 2004 Workshop on Multimedia
and Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2004, pp. 180–186.
[34] R. Sion, M. Atallah, and S. Prabhakar, “Rights protection for relational
data,” in Proceedings of the 2003 ACM International Conference on Man-
agement of Data (SIGMOD). ACM Press, 2003, pp. 98–109.
[35] R. Sion, “Rights assessment for relational data,” in Secure Data Manage-
ment in Decentralized Systems, T. Yu and S. Jajodia, Eds. Springer, 2007,
pp. 427–457.
[36] K. LeFevre, D. J. Dewitt, and R. Ramakrishnan, “Incognito: Efficient
full-domain k-anonymity,” in SIGMOD ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2005, pp. 49–60.
[37] P. Samarati, “Protecting respondents’ identities in microdata release,”
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 13, no. 6,
2001.
[38] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney, “Protecting privacy when disclosing informa-
tion: k-anonymity and its enforcement through generalization and suppres-
sion,” SRI, Tech. Rep., 1998.
[39] A. Meyerson and R. Williams, “On the complexity of optimal k-
anonymity,” in PODS ’04: Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM
SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Sys-
tems. New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2004, pp. 223–228.
[40] G. Aggarwal, T. Feder, K. Kenthapadi, R. Motwani, R. Panigrahy,
D. Thomas, and A. Zhu, “Anonymizing tables,” in Database Theory -
ICDT, ser. LNCS, vol. 3363. Springer, 2005, pp. 246–258.
[41] J.-W. Byun, A. Kamra, E. Bertino, and N. Li, “Efficient k-anonymization
using clustering techniques,” in Proc. of the 12th International Conference
on Database Systems for Advanced Applications (DASFAA), ser. LNCS,
vol. 4443. Springer, 2007, pp. 188–200.
27
[42] S. Zhong, Z. Yang, and R. N. Wright, “Privacy-enhancing k-anonymization
of customer data,” in PODS ’05: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth ACM
SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Sys-
tems. New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2005, pp. 139–147.
[43] R. J. Bayardo and R. Agrawal, “Data privacy through optimal k-
anonymization,” in Proc. of 21st Int. Conf. on Data Engineering (ICDE).
IEEE Computer Society, 2005, pp. 217–228.
[44] W. Du and M. J. Atallah, “Secure multi-party computation problems and
their applications: a review and open problems,” in Workshop on New
Security Paradigms (NSPW), 2001, pp. 13–22.
[45] M. Freedman, K. Nissim, and B. Pinkas, “Efficient private matching and
set intersection,” in Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2004., 2004.
[46] M. J. Atallah and J. Li, “Secure outsourcing of sequence comparisons,”
International Journal of Information Security, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 277–287,
2005.
[47] D. S. Hirschberg, “A linear space algorithm for computing maximal com-
mon subsequences,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 341–
343, 1975.
[48] C. S. Iliopoulos and M. S. Rahman, “Algorithms for computing variants of
the longest common subsequence problem,” Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 395, no. 2-3, pp. 255–267, 2008.
[49] J. D. Ullman, A. V. Aho, and D. S. Hirschberg, “Bounds on the complexity
of the longest common subsequence problem,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 23,
no. 1, pp. 1–12, 1976.
[50] J. R. Troncoso-Pastoriza, S. Katzenbeisser, and M. Celik, “Privacy pre-
serving error resilient DNA searching through oblivious automata,” in 14th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2007,
pp. 519–528.
[51] A. Amirbekyan and V. Estivill-Castro, “A new efficient privacy-preserving
scalar product protocol,” in AusDM ’07: 6th Australasian Conf. on Data
Mining and Analytics, 2007, pp. 209–214.
[52] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton, “Secure set intersection cardinality with appli-
cation to association rule mining,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 13,
no. 4, pp. 593–622, 2005.
[53] Y. Sang and H. Shen, “Privacy preserving set intersection based on bilinear
groups,” in 31st Australasian Conf. on Computer science (ACSC), 2008,
pp. 47–54.
28
[54] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, “How to play any mental game,”
in STOC ’87: Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 1987, pp. 218–229.
[55] W. Du and M. J. Atallah, “Protocols for secure remote database access with
approximate matching,” in E-Commerce Security and Privacy: Advances
in Information Security, Volume 2, A. K. Ghosh, Ed. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001, pp. 87–112.
[56] L. Backstrom, C. Dwork, and J. Kleinberg, “Wherefore art thou r3579x?:
Anonymized social networks, hidden patterns, and structural steganogra-
phy,” in WWW ’07: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on
World Wide Web. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2007, pp. 181–190.
[57] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large sparse
datasets,” in SP ’08: Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2008, pp.
111–125.
[58] R. Dorfman, “The detection of defective members of large populations,”
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 14, pp. 436–440, 1943.
[59] D.-Z. Du and F. K. Hwang, Combinatorial Group Testing and Its Applica-
tions, 2nd ed. World Scientific, 2000.
[60] D. Eppstein, M. T. Goodrich, and D. S. Hirschberg, “Improved combinato-
rial group testing for real-world problem sizes,” in Workshop on Algorithms
and Data Structures (WADS), ser. Lecture Notes Comput. Sci. Springer,
2005.
[61] M. Ruszinko´, “On the upper bound of the size of the r-cover-free families,”
Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series A, vol. 66, pp. 302–310, 1994.
[62] D. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming. Addison-Wesley, 1973.
[63] J. Leskovec, D. Huttenlocher, and J. Kleinberg, “Signed networks in so-
cial media,” in 28th ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, 2010.
[64] M. Gjoka, M. Kurant, C. T. Butts, and A. Markopoulou, “A walk in face-
book: Uniform sampling of users in online social networks,” CoRR, vol.
abs/0906.0060, 2009.
[65] A. L. Traud, E. D. Kelsic, P. J. Mucha, and M. A. Porter, “Community
structure in online collegiate social networks,” 2008, arXiv:0809.0960.
[66] A. U. Asuncion and M. T. Goodrich, “Turning privacy leaks into floods:
surreptitious discovery of social network friendships and other sensitive
binary attribute vectors,” in WPES ’10: Proceedings of the 9th Annual
ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 21–30.
29
